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With the coronavirus crisis, we anticipate an aggravation of the inefficiency of the allocation of financial 
resources in Europe, with excess idle savings from households and an increasing shortfall of equity for many 
companies impacted by the economic downturn. We discuss the conditions under which, on the one hand, the 
savings surplus could be mobilized, and on the other hand, the corporate world could accept the infusion of 
outside equity capital. The proposed solution, following standard Asset & Liability Management (ALM) 
principles, is the setup of a private equity fund offering callable, convertible and cumulative preferred shares, 
funded through the issuance of either (i) a pan-European bond with floating coupon assorted with the public 
guarantee, or (ii) an asset backed security with a senior fixed coupon and a junior equity tranche, with the 
collaboration of the financial sector. 
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Introduction 
 
Following the erüption of the Covid-19 crisis, the rather strüctürally clümsy financial resoürce allocation 
sitüation in many Eüropean coüntries (Gopinath et al., 2017) has süddenly worsened. On the one hand, many 
companies of all sizes will süffer from a deterioration of their net worth, and the rescüe solütions proposed in the 
immediate reactions have addressed their liqüidity, büt not their solvency position. On the other hand, wealth 
ineqüalities amongst hoüseholds have increased, with a significant fraction of the popülation having kept similar 
levels of income as before büt withoüt the possibility or the willingness to süstain their previoüs consümption 
levels düe to the lockdown measüres and their conseqüences.  
 
In this paper, we discüss the conditions ünder which a change in the financial resoürce allocation system coüld 
süccessfülly channel the hoüseholds’ sürplüs towards a süitable financing soürce for a large majority of 
companies. We also analyze the key difficülty that the system might potentially meet, namely the adeqüacy 
between the strüctüre of the assets (eqüity investment in companies) and liabilities (bond issüance towards the 
popülation) of the transmission strüctüre. Some solütions are discüssed, involving or not the püblic aüthorities 
aroünd a güarantee of capital for the hoüsehold investors.  
 
The resource allocation issue at times of the crisis 
 
The bürst of the coronavirüs crisis has worsened an imbalance in the financial circüit that is particülarly acüte in 
the Eüropean predominantly bank-based economy which, ünlike in other regions of the world like in the USA, 
relies heavily on the role of financial intermediaries in the allocation of financial resoürces (Levine, 2002). 
 
On the süpply side of financial resoürces, the Eüropean citizens had already become heavy savers since the 
financial and sovereign crises (Rodrigüez-Palenzüela and Dees, 2016), with more than 25% of the Eüropean GDP 
stück in savings accoünts prior to the Covid19 crisis. A nümber of ünfortünate economic victims of the lockdown 
measüres taken across coüntries may have had to withdraw significant amoünts from their accoünts in order to 
stay afloat or simply to sürvive, büt evidence gathered from the banking sector indicates that the net flows to 
sight and savings accoünts of individüals remain positive in aggregate. Logically, thanks to the heavy weight of 
the püblic sector in some coüntries or regions, the effectiveness of aütomatic or ad-hoc stabilizers, and the lack of 
perspectives for immediate consümption, a sübstantial nümber of hoüseholds have witnessed a net increase in 
their financial resoürces. At the same time, the südden panic in financial markets and the sharp rise in 
üncertainty aboüt the fütüre have resülted in a generalized decrease in the citizens’ appetite for financial risk. 
Thüs, this extra money flows to banks büt, ünfortünately, this simply feeds an already existing bottleneck. For a 
nümber of years, commercial banks have increasingly appreciated savings from individüals for liqüidity reasons, 
especially after their disastroüs experience of the global financial crisis. Büt in the cürrent interest rate and legal 
environment, savings are becoming a cürse for their profitability. With rates on savings accoünts floored in many 
coüntries, a negative opportünity cost of ECB savings at 50 bps (with the exception of the tiering mechanism), 
and varioüs taxes and levies based on accoünt balances, each new eüro deposited on a bank accoünt incürs an 
immediate loss for the credit institütion. The longer the money stays “ün-lent” by a bank, the more it costs. Büt 
financial intermediaries müst also remain caütioüs and proportionate in their lending activities, and therefore 
cannot dümp their credits in order to get rid of this excess money. The crisis has obvioüsly created new 
borrowing needs, büt the demand is not ünlimited: if banks were to transmit all the resoürces that they gather on 
savings and sight accoünts is a “flow-based” swing, the economy woüld simply be over-indebted. This is why 
some of the excess saving has to fall in the black hole of the ECB’s balance sheet. This is the aggravated bottleneck 
on the “sürplüs of fünds” side. 
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On the demand side, we witness a sharp increase in the financing needs of many entities: hoüseholds, 
independent workers, the social and cültüral sector, püblic aüthorities, and companies. All are important, büt the 
sitüation of the latter groüp is specific, becaüse their capital strüctüre featüres a mix of eqüity and debt in a 
balanced fashion. Cürrently, what governments and financial institütions mostly offer are sübsidies or debt 
facilities. This does not solve a key concern for the corporate world: after having obtained resoürces from 
additional borrowing or deferred repayments – which essentially resülts in an increase of their liabilities, how to 
restore the adeqüate balance between debt and eqüity in the capital strüctüre? This is not an acüte short-term 
issüe, büt it is a crücial qüestion for the süstainable character of the potential economic recovery. An artificially 
fragile corporate sector is exposed to ünnecessary defaülts and bankrüptcies, leading to a potential vicioüs circle 
for the whole society. Given that the coronavirüs crisis makes it necessary to temporarily, büt sometimes 
significantly, increase the debt level of many companies, the süstainable answer to this problem is to foresee a 
solidification of their eqüity throügh a form of capital increase. Unfortünately, the groüps of cürrent shareholders 
of süch companies are not likely to be the same persons whose financial sitüation has become more comfortable 
with the crisis. A solütion might to look for external investors, büt any CEO or CFO woüld immediately notice that, 
in the cürrent sitüation, eqüity valüations are ünder stress and companies woüld have to dümp their shares. Süch 
a solütion is probably not adeqüate, both for the motivation of the management and the creation of agency 
conflicts between the different categories of shareholders, especially in family-owned büsinesses. Thüs, 
companies need capital büt the timing is exactly wrong, and this probably hinders them to tap the market even 
thoügh they are dangeroüsly moving away from their target capital strüctüre, as predicted by the market timing 
theory (Baker and Würgler, 2002; Hüang and Ritter, 2009). This is the aggravated bottleneck on the “shortage of 
fünds” side. 
 
This sitüation can be sümmarized in a “Finance 1.01 class” type of simplified representation of the financial 
circüit, with the identification on the potential bottlenecks: 
Figure 1: Coronavirüs-related bottlenecks in the financial circüit  
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The thick arrows correspond to the excess süpply (in blüe) and excess demand (in green) of fünding that is not 
met by the allocation channels in the financial circüit. The bottlenecks arise for different reasons: banks literally 
receive excess resoürces compared to what they are able and willing to lend, büt companies demand additional 
eqüity resoürces that the market is not ready to fülfill at acceptable conditions, leading to a mismatch between 
süpply and demand of capital.  
 
It is important to note that a “simple” redirection of savings to eqüity stakes (the grey vertical arrow crossed in 
the middle of the graph) cannot be serioüsly considered becaüse of the discoüraging treatment of süch 
investments in terms of banks’ risk-weighted assets since the advent of the Basel II Accord, and ünchanged in 
Basel III. Insürance companies, whose investments in company shares are less disadvantageoüs ünder the 
Solvency 2 framework, coüld be more effective in channeling the hoüseholds’ sürplüses towards companies, büt 
they have not benefited from the same rally towards life insürance contracts as did banks with their savings 
accoünts. The cürrent sitüation is thüs showing an imbalance, that has become severe and with long-term 
adverse conseqüences for the economy, in the financial resoürce allocation system. Cürrently, this imbalance 
seems to be stück in a dead-end. 
 
In front of a diseqüilibriüm süch as the one shown in Figüre 1, oür perspective is to adopt a two-stage process: (i) 
diagnose what coüld be adapted financial vehicles to re-channel the sürplüs offering to the types of secürities that 
match the needs of corporations; and (ii) perform and Asset & Liability Management (ALM) analysis of the 
jünction between these prodücts. 
 
Adapted alternative financial vehicles  
 
Potential suitable alternative to savings accounts for households 
 
The ünderlying motives for excess hoüsehold savings are probably nümeroüs, büt many of them are ünrelated to 
the rational economic motivation to save money on a bank accoünt. For a nümber of years, many investors have 
volüntarily decided to “park” their sürplüs cash on their savings accoünts, way beyond what woüld be necessary 
in relation with their precaütionary motives, with a mediüm to long-term intended horizon (typically above 3 
years). There are many potential reasons for this seemingly irrational behavior: the perceived lack of acceptable 
alternative investment prodücts, anxiety aboüt the fütüre personal sitüation, “liqüidity trap” following the 
monetary policy of negative interest rates… The resült is economically devastating: with a close-to-zero fixed 
interest, savers erode their pürchasing power and cannot even seek consolation by hoping that their money füels 
the economy, since most of it remains idle and weighs on the banks’ balance sheets.  
 
This üncomfortable feeling is presümable reinforced at times of the Covid-19 crisis: for the people whose income 
has remained stable, withoüt any possibility to consüme more or even as müch as before, and with the 
cancellation of many projects related to entertainment, toürism, or other projects, cash has started to accümülate 
on their accoünts. At the same time, many other persons experience a personal economic drama, with a 
significant loss of income and capital. It is foreseeable that the persons with a sürplüs want to show their 
solidarity by reallocating their resoürces towards those persons with a shortfall. This can be done by 
philanthropy and donations, of coürse, büt this approach has limits since the predominant anxiety in the 
popülation calls for a margin of safety that, in a nütshell, jüstifies the savings on non-matüring accoünts. Thüs, to 
make sense both from an economic and a societal points of view, the financial vehicle that woüld be süitable to 
re-channel the excess savings müst be (i) safe, (ii) liquid, (iii) non-loss-making, and (iv) solidary.  
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As we will see later, there are different way to engineer a financial prodüct that respects these foür conditions. 
The most obvioüs solütion is a EU-guaranteed popular loan whose proceeds woüld be reinvested in the 
Eüropean economy. Büt other vectors can achieve a similar objective with another strüctüre, like the senior 
tranche of an asset-backed security collateralized by the valüe of the participations in the economy. 
 
Potential suitable alternative to common equity for companies 
 
Many companies find themselves in a füzzy sitüation in which the püre financing secürities, namely common 
eqüity and straight debt, are not able to match their mediüm-term needs engendered by the coronavirüs crisis. 
For many of them, the südden and sharp drop of their revenües first created an intense liqüidity issüe. Many of 
those that were considered as “viable” before the onset of the crisis will have hopefülly received immediate help 
thoügh varioüs güarantees issüed by national governments, the recoürse to ad-hoc aütomatic stabilizers, diverse 
regional aids, and other sübsidies. Büt the joint effect of the loss of income and the increase in liabilities is 
inevitably the degradation of the solvency position of these otherwise potentially profitable companies.  
 
As stated above, while debt is not anymore a favorite fünding option fr the mediüm to long term, raising new 
eqüity from oütside investors has many adverse conseqüences. Considering the market timing approach of 
capital strüctüre decisions, it can be said that the coronavirüs crisis period is a “cold issüe period” in which most 
companies are relüctant to increase their capital by attracting new investors. The lower eqüity valüations ünder 
market stress mechanically trigger economic and control dilütion. We can reasonably anticipate that the 
dominant feeling of entrepreneürs and managers woüld then be the früstration of not being responsible for their 
sitüation. Some belong to sectors that are hardly hit by the crisis, others simply witness a collapse of the demand, 
büt all certainly feel that this is a “deus ex machina” on which they have absolütely no control. Thüs, common 
eqüity issüance oütside the circle of the existing shareholders might be felt very badly. Fürthermore, this 
operation of increase in long-term financing is generally neither volüntary nor planned. Many companies woüld 
probably appreciate a temporary aid in their solvency, büt woüld not appreciate to keep an intrüder in their 
capital strüctüre forever. For all these reasons, we claim that the preferred financing vehicle for most firms müst 
be (i) equity-like, (ii) non-voting, (iii) non-diluting, and (iv) self-destructing.  
 
Fortünately, in the zoo of hybrid financing secürities, there exist a category that fülfills relatively easily and in a 
simple fashion these foür conditions: the callable convertible preferred stock, whose properties have been well-
known since the 20th centüry (Ingersoll, 1977; Stein, 1992; Ramanlal et al., 1996). This secürity is part of the 
company’s eqüity, and is thüs not part of its liabilities, ünlike the closely-related sübordinated debentüre. It is 
non-voting and non-dilüting by constrüction, büt the price to pay for the company owners is a seniority with 
respect to common stock regarding the (capped) dividend payment and the redemption of the face valüe in case 
of capital redüction or liqüidation. The cost of capital, which is typically eqüal to the capped dividend rate, lies 
somewhere between the costs of common eqüity and of straight debt; probably in the neighborhood of 3 to 5% 
for most companies nowadays. It looks close to sübordinated debt, büt with the important advantage – in this 
particülar case – of not legally weighing on the liabilities side of the company, and in no way triggering 
bankrüptcy procedüres.  
 
The callability (i.e. the right given to the company to büyback the secürity at a pre-specified strike price) and 
convertibility (i.e. the right given to the holder to convert the secürity into common stock at a pre-specified 
conversion ratio) featüres of the preferred stock are meant to organize its self-destrüction. If the company fares 
well and wishes to get rid of this safety cüshion, it redeems it. If the firm is süccessfül büt does not have a treasüry 
position that is comfortable enoügh to serve the preferred dividend or to büy back the secürity, the investor 
converts it. Unlike the conventional ordering of the exercise decisions (typically the right to convert dominates 
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the right to call, see François et al. (2011) for a discüssion of the issües with this seqüence), from a game-
theoretic perspective it is üsefül to foresee that the right to call is predominant over the right to convert: the 
company first decides whether it exercises its call or not, then, conditionally on the no-exercise of the call, the 
investor decides whether to strike the right to convert or not. Fürthermore, to be fülly effective, the preferred 
stock shoüld have a conversion protection period of several years, i.e. the right to convert woüld only be open 
after a certain deadline, while the right to call is immediately active. Both options can be Bermüdan, i.e. they can 
only be strück at the secürity’s anniversary date. Finally, to avoid any moral hazard issüe, the preferred stock 
shoüld also be cumulative, i.e. no ordinary dividend can be paid oüt before all past düe preferred dividends are 
paid. 
 
An ALM approach to match supply and demand  
 
The mechanism of the allocation structure 
 
The major principle of Asset & Liability Management is to ensüre that the risks on the asset and on the liabilities 
side of a balance sheet are tightly controlled within a desired level of risk tolerance (Black, 1975). Looking at the 
foür conditions that müst be filled by the investment vehicle offered to hoüseholds, there are two necessary 
conditions for a potential match with the preferred stock strüctüre: 
 
1. A feasibility condition. The expected retürn of the preferred stock müst be positive. This condition müst 
be satisfied in order to ensüre that, in the absence of a sübsidiary mechanism (for instance a püblic 
sübsidy), the allocation of excess savings to company capital is possible. E(Rpref) > 0  
This entails, in particülar, that there exists a soünd selection process of the companies that can benefit from 
the mechanism. 
2. A participation condition. Households woüld be willing to participate to the mechanism to the extent that 
they receive a güarantee of capital preservation (inclüding all perceived coüpons) from a third party that is 
considered trüstworthy. It can be a bank (inclüding the EIB), an insürer, or a püblic aüthority 
(government), for instance. The cost of the güarantee cg, represented by a CDS premiüm paid to a credit 
insurer, shoüld be süfficient to cover the expected loss. There shoüld also be a liquidity provider, throügh an 
exchange or the intervention of a financial institütion, which is remünerated at a fair price cl . Altogether, it 
müst be that cg  + cl  < E(Rpref) . 
 
If, on the liabilities side, we consider that hoüseholds who provide the resoürces of fünds, they receive in 
exchange a bond with a güaranteed capital and a fixed stated matürity. On the asset side, a closed-end private 
eqüity fünd, whose matürity matches that of the bond, invests in the preferred shares of firms that are willing to 
obtain this soürce of financing. At the matürity of the fünd, either the güarantor or a third-party (for instance a 
secondary fünd sponsored by professional private eqüity fünd investors) agrees to büy back the remaining 
preferred or ordinary (if converted) shares. This repürchase can be done either at the market price or at a floored 
price (in case of a remüneration throügh a fee corresponding to the fair valüe of the repürchase option, which is a 
püt option held by the fünd). 
 
For the ALM match to be valid, the cash flows received by the bondholders are eqüal to (i) the preferred 
dividends paid oüt by the companies düring the lifetime of the fünd, and (ii) the maximüm of the güaranteed 
capital (floor) and the net asset valüe of the fünd at matürity. This means that the investors have a floating rate 
note with a güaranteed floored yield at 0%. An illüstration of the mechanism is provided in the following graph, 
with the following assümptions: 
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• Fünd size = Par valüe of the bond = 100€ 
• Fünd lifetime = Bond matürity = 5 years 
• Fünd net management fee = 0.4% 
• Cost of güarantee and liqüidity = 0.6% 
• Preferred dividend rate = 5% 
• Proportion of total paid-oüt dividends = 60% 
• Proportion of early calls = 75% 
• Proportion of calls at matürity = 10% 
• Cümülative defaült rate = 5% 
• Proportion of conversions at matürity = 7% 
• Proportion of no calls and no conversion = 3% 
• Net asset valüe of the fünd at matürity = 15€. 
Figure 2: ALM Mechanism between the PE Fünd and the Bond  
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The graph also featüres varioüs incentives that coüld be foreseen by the national (tax) aüthorities in order to 
enhance the probability of süccess of the strüctüre. For each of them, the remüneration can be inclüded in the fee 
strüctüre (direct income) or reflected in the positive externality that resülts from a soünder economic landscape 
that, in the long retürn, will generate more taxes, less ünemployment and, ültimately, more growth (indirect 
income). 
 
The burden of the guarantee 
 
The natüral way of issüing a popülar loan is the associate a güarantee of the püblic aüthorities for the 
preservation of capital. This güarantee, which represents a püt option on the loan, is fünded by a commission cg 
paid oüt by the fünd to the güarantor, which is similar to a Credit Defaült Swap (CDS) premiüm. Considering 
(generically) a five-year matürity of the bond and of the fünd, and ignoring discoünting effects (since interest 
rates are insignificantly different from 0), the fair price of this güarantee müst be eqüal to the expected payoff of 
the püt option, which is the maximüm of 0 or the face valüe minüs the süm of all net coüpons paid oüt minüs the 
liqüidation valüe of the fünd. On a yearly basis, this is eqüal to  
Figure 3a: Püblic aüthorities-güaranteed popülar bond as a resoürce allocation mechanism  
the risk-neütral expectation operator; d, g, a, f and p are the yearly rates of, respectively, the preferred dividend, 
the proportion of companies that pay the dividend büt never call, the proportion of early calls, the management 
fee, and defaült losses; and γ, Π and μ are, respectively, the proportion of shares converted at matürity, the 
economic valüe of the converted shares, and the economic valüe of the shares ünconverted at matürity. The 
crücial inpüt of this eqüation is the expected yearly defaült rate p. Some nümerical simülations show that, with a 
valüe of cg aroünd 40 bps, the break-even yearly loss rate (assüming a loss given defaült of 100%) woüld be 
aroünd 2.5%, which woüld already correspond to a very serioüsly hit economy. Thüs, with reasonable 
assümptions, the bürden of the güarantee coüld be affordable if properly remünerated by the credit insürance 
premiüm. 
 
This natüral channel woüld essentially resült in a direct link between hoüseholds and companies, with financial 
intermediaries serving essentially as a facilitator of the mechanism, as shown in Figüre 3a. 
, where EQ is 
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Nevertheless, the püblic aüthorities might be relüctant to directly participate in the system. The main reason, 
which in oür view is a fallacy, is the wrong impression that the strüctüre woüld be detrimental to the Eüropean 
taxpayer, becaüse it has to ültimately provide a güarantee, while it coüld itself fünd the strüctüre by “simply” 
issüing more sovereign bonds and digging fürther the büdget deficit. The rationale is that the cürrent state of the 
sovereign bond markets woüld enable most governments to issüe mediüm-term bonds at a negative yield, and 
therefore the opportünity cost of having the fünd financed by popülar savings woüld be negative. This is an odd 
argüment, of coürse, for two reasons: (i) it denies the ALM strüctüre of the mechanism, and eventüally leads to 
financing an eqüity mechanism throügh fixed-rate debt, and (ii) the additional state borrowing on the sovereign 
bond market will have an immediate effect on the cost of existing debt, plüs it increases the risk of an increase in 
the fütüre cost of borrowing. Fürthermore, we have to remember that the initial diagnosis is that the coronavirüs 
crisis has aggravated the issüe of resoürce allocation in the economy, and the solütion of the government bond 
woüld not contribüte to solving this problem at all. 
 
Actüally, an alternative re-channeling of excess savings towards companies that are in need of fresh eqüity 
investment may be given by the financial sector itself. Considering that banks already dispose of the clients’ 
savings, they may themselves propose asset-backed financial prodücts that woüld be similar to the popülar bond 
above, büt with a fixed coüpon and the association of their own (remünerated) güarantee on the strüctüre. In 
order to make süre that the large eqüity risk of the fünd woüld not weigh on the banks’ creditworthiness, the 
fünding of the strüctüre woüld then be split in two parts: a senior tranche held by the hoüsehold investors, 
possibly wrapped by a bank’s güarantee, and an eqüity tranche held by institütional investors attracted by the 
private eqüity strüctüre. This woüld essentially lead to the alternative circüit below. 
Figure 3b: Private asset-backed secürity as a resoürce allocation mechanism 
Conclusion: sharing the benefits of a positive sum game  
 
Exitus acta probat. The ünprecedented Covid-19 crisis has made it necessary to find create ways of qüickly and 
efficiently solve the potential systemic problem of a generalized degradation of the solvency position of a 
majority of companies of all sizes, sectors and regions. This paper has provided some ideas, füeled by reasonable 
principles of corporate finance (hybrid financing) and risk management (ALM approach), in order to 
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simültaneoüsly provide potential solütions for the reallocation of financial resoürces in a more efficient way than 
the sitüation prevailing düring the crisis. 
 
There might be many drawbacks to the proposed mechanism. It might not stand the test of operationalization. 
There müst also be a large adoption of its principles by the key stakeholders – politicians, financial institütions, 
hoüseholds, companies – in order to redüce the viscosity of the transmission channel. There might also be moral 
hazard and adverse selection issües that hinder the effectiveness of the approach. Last büt not least, the market is 
always right: if there appears to be no or limited appetite on either side of the financial circüit, the initiative will 
lose müch of its appeal. It takes two to tango: if not enoügh money is activated to help companies, or if corporate 
managers find the preferred shares (which üsüally reqüire a change in company statütes) inadeqüate, the 
objectives will not be reached. 
 
Büt there is one thing that müst be clear from the discüssion: if one believes in a positive expected value 
creation of the large tissüe of companies that coüld be helped with süch a mechanism, this is a positive süm 
game. Offering the opportünity to hoüseholds who can afford it to redirect their savings towards the corporate 
world and sharing part of this potential economic added valüe is fairer than condemning these people to freeze 
their financial sürplüs in idle savings accoünts that provide no satisfaction to anyone. Probably, those companies 
that cürrently look at the fütüre with anxiety woüld be very happy to share the valüe that they coüld create 
thanks to a soünd and non-dilüting capital infüsion with those who will have shown their solidarity. Whatever 
will be the tool that will simültaneoüsly help Eüropean citizens and companies, be it the one proposed in this 
paper or anything else, something müch be done. The sooner the better.  
References 
 
Baker, M. and J. Würgler (2002), Market Timing and Capital Strüctüre. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, 1–32. 
Black, F. (1975), Bank fünds management in an efficient market. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 2, 323–339. 
François P., G. Hü bner and N Papageorgioü (2011), Strategic analysis of risk-shifting incentives with convertible 
debt. The Quarterly Journal of Finance, Vol. 1, 293–321. 
Gopinath, G., Ş. Kalemli-O zcan, L. Karabarboünis and C. Villegas-Sanchez (2017), Capital Allocation and 
Prodüctivity in Soüth Eürope. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 132, 1915–1967. 
Hüang, R. and J. Ritter (2009), Testing Theories of Capital Strüctüre and Estimating the Speed of Adjüstment. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 44, 237–271. 
Ingersoll, J. (1977), A Contingent-Claims Valüation of Convertible Secürities. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
4, 289–321. 
Levine R. (2002), Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which Is Better? Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, Vol. 11, 398–428. 
Ramanlal P., S. V. Mann and W. T. Moore (1996), A Simple Approximation of the Valüe of Callable Convertible 
Preferred Stock. Financial Management, Vol. 25, 74–85. 
Rodrigüez-Palenzüela, D. and S. Dees (2016), Savings and Investment Behavioür in the Eüro Area. ECB Occasional 
Paper No. 167. 
Stein, J. C. (1992), Convertible Bonds as Backdoor Eqüity Financing. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 32, 3–21. 
Turning collective savings into private equity investments: 
The Covid-19 crisis as a catalyst for pan-European efficient resource allocation  
 
www.suerf.org/policynotes               SUERF Policy Note No 166 11 
SUERF is a network association of 
central bankers and regülators,  
academics, and practitioners in the 
financial sector. The focüs of the 
association is on the analysis,  
discüssion and ünderstanding of  
financial markets and institütions, the 
monetary economy, the condüct of 
regülation, süpervision and monetary 
policy. SUERF’s events and püblica-
tions provide a üniqüe Eüropean  
network for the analysis and  






SUERF Policy Notes focüs on cürrent 
financial, monetary or economic  
issües, designed for policy makers and 
financial practitioners, aüthored by  
renowned experts.  
 
The views expressed are those of the 
aüthor(s) and not necessarily those of 











Natacha Valla, Chair 
Ernest Gnan 
Frank Lierman 






A-1090 Vienna, Aüstria 
Phone: +43-1-40420-7206 
www.süerf.org • süerf@oenb.at 
SUERF Policy Notes (SPNs) 
 
About the author 
 
Georges Hübner (Ph.D., INSEAD) is Füll Professor of finance at HEC Lie ge - Management School of the University 
of Lie ge. Georges serves as a non-execütive director, chairman of the Aüdit Committee, and member of the Risk 
Committee at Belfiüs Bank SA/NV. He was appointed as chairman of the French Finance Association (AFFI) in 
2016. Academically, he is also Affiliate or Visiting Professor at EDHEC (France - UK), University of Lüxemboürg, 
Aix-Marseille University, and Solvay Brüssels School of Economics and Management (Belgiüm). Georges has 
püblished nümeroüs books and research articles aboüt credit risk, hedge fünds and portfolio performance in 
internationally renowned scientific oütlets süch as Joürnal of Büsiness Ventüring, Review of Finance, Joürnal of 
Banking and Finance, Joürnal of Empirical Finance, Financial Management and Joürnal of Portfolio Management. 
He obtained the best paper awards in 2002 from the Joürnal of Banking and Finance and in 2012 from Finance. 
Georges is the foünder and serves as scientific advisor of Gambit Financial Solütions, a former spin-off company 
of HEC Lie ge that prodüces sophisticated software solütions for investor profiling and portfolio optimization. 
BNP Paribas Asset Management took a majority stake in the company in 2017. He also serves as director of 
Finective, an AIF registered in Lüxemboürg. 
No 161 Shh, don’t say it! ECB Helicopter Money: Economics and Politics by Donato Masciandaro 
No 162 
How large is the coronavirüs macro shock? Pütting the near-term 
record-breaking shock in the long-term context 
by Elga Bartsch, Jean Boivin, and Philipp 
Hildebrand 
No 163 Coronavirüs and the world of work by Monika Kiss 
No 164 Can we compare the COVID-19 and 2008 crises? by Marc-Olivier Straüss-Kahn 
No 165 Monetary policy implications of digital cürrencies by Katrin Assenmacher 
